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We analyze a large database collected from newspaper articles that report on major episodes of 
corporate restructuring in Japan between 1981 and 2007. By linking this database with financial 
data on public firms, we identify changes in the likelihood that a distressed undergoes 
restructuring, as well as in some measures adopted during restructuring. We find that the way 
distressed Japanese firms are restructured has changed during this period. The likelihood that a 
large distressed firm with high levels of debt undergoes restructuring has declined. Those firms 
that undergo restructuring continue to adopt more aggressive measures in terms of layoffs and 
cutbacks than other distressed firms, suggesting that “restructuring”, when it happens, involves 
real adjustments. Banks continue to be important for firms with a clearly identified main bank, 
and the main bank is more likely to push for more drastic reductions in debt and bank loans than 
other entities leading a restructuring event. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 It is well-known that restructuring of troubled companies in Japan used to be based on 
bailout processes initiated by the distressed company’s main bank or major trading partners. In a 
typical case, the main bank, being a large shareholder and usually the largest lender, intervened 
in a distressed borrower by dispatching executives and restructuring debt (often with the help of 
other lenders) with an eye toward turnaround so that the company would recover and resume 
debt repayment. Most bailouts were informal in nature: rarely were courts involved, and 
law-based bankruptcy procedures were exceedingly rare for large public companies.  
Given its large exposure in both debt and equity, the main bank had a clear economic 
interest in the recovery of the customer. Moreover, it also strove to maintain its reputation as a 
dependable monitor on behalf of other lenders. Sheard (1989) argues that this type of reciprocal 
delegated monitoring reduced costs by eliminating duplication of the monitoring effort. Under 
delegated monitoring, the main bank was responsible for rescuing a client in financial trouble. 
Politics may occasionally have played a role, as the government had set strong priorities toward 
supporting Japan’s largest companies, in order to uphold employment.1   
 During the 1990s, Japan’s political economy, and with it the incentives and constraints 
faced by banks and large companies, began to change. One important factor was gradual 
financial deregulation that began in the late 1970s, and the subsequent disintermediation. As 
large firms diversified their sources of financing, banks started to lose their largest customers. As 
this happened, they looked for other (smaller) clients, especially those with land to be used as 
collateral for loans. Many of these new clients found themselves in trouble after asset prices 
collapsed in the early 1990s. The non-performing loan problem escalated into a full blown crisis 
in the late 1990s, and continued into the early 2000s.  
 The banking crisis led to great changes in Japan’s banking industry. The severity of the 
crisis invited important legal change, partially in order to help banks reduce their nonperforming 
loans, and partially help companies restructure and reorganize their business in new ways (as 
explained in detail in Section 2). A 2001 law mandated the reduction of banks’ shareholding in 
other companies, thereby reducing the banks’ equity stake in clients. The 2002 Financial Revival 
Program, pushed by Heizo Takenaka (Minister of Financial Affairs in the Koizumi government), 
                                                 
1 There is a large literature on Japan’s main bank system in general, and main bank interventions in 
particular. See, for example, Aoki and Patrick (1994); Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990); Hoshi and 
Kashyap (2001); Hirota and Miyajima (2001); Kaplanand Minton (1994); Kang and Shivdasani (1995); 
Morck and Nakamura (1999); and Sheard (1989, 1994). 
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put great emphasis on non-performing loan cleanup and was associated with a new political push 
toward direct loan write-offs, even for companies that might previously have been considered 
“too big to fail”. New bankruptcy legislation and court processes introduced in the early 2000s 
afforded companies a choice between bank-led informal workouts and formal, court-based 
procedures. Changes in corporate law also introduced new options for corporate reorganization.  
 This paper looks at whether and how these changes have affected processes of corporate 
restructuring in Japan. Based on a database of major corporate restructuring cases between 1981 
and 2007, combined with financial data for large Japanese firms, we study the incidence and 
content of restructuring. We identify changes over time in what triggered the onset of corporate 
restructuring, who led corporate restructuring (i.e., the role of banks), and how restructuring 
effected employment, capital growth, bank loan growth and total debt growth of the distressed 
company. We find that the likelihood that a large distressed firm undergoes restructuring has 
decreased over time, especially in the early 2000s. Moreover, firms under restructuring show 
lower growth in employment, capital, and debt than other distressed firms. Finally, we find that 
restructuring measures are more pronounced when a bank or a private equity fund leads the 
effort. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the background by highlighting a few 
important changes related to corporate restructuring in Japan. Section 3 introduces the database 




2.  Changes since the late 1990s  
 
 The period of 1998-2006 brought great changes to Japan’s corporate strategy-making, so 
much so that Schaede (2008) has labeled this period a “strategic inflection point”. It coincides 
with political leadership of Hashimoto and Koizumi, who brought the 1998 “Big Bang” financial 
deregulation and shifted Japan toward the motto “leave it to the market”.  
 The Big Bang reforms marked a final stage of gradual financial deregulation that began 
in the late 1970s. As Hoshi and Kashyap (1999, 2001) point out, this long process was skewed 
because deregulation that expanded financing options for large companies proceeded more 
quickly than deregulation expanding options for banks or savers. As a result, banks started to 
lose corporate customers while savers continued to hold large portions of their assets in bank 
deposits. The banks searched for new clients among small- and medium-sized companies, 
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especially those in the real estate business. But whereas those new clients had looked promising 
during the land price boom of the 1980s, loans turned sour as land prices dropped in the 1990s.  
Non-performing loans were a major problem for Japanese banks throughout the decade, and 
triggered a severe financial crisis from late 1997 to early 1999. 
 Rather than a reversal in banking regulation, the crisis further pushed deregulation, 
especially under the Koizumi government (2001-2006). As the government allowed several large 
financial institutions to fail, and raised pressure on banks to reduce their non-performing loans, it 
became clear that it was no longer blindly supporting bailouts of large firms. Partially in 
response to this shift, large companies called for more options in corporate reorganization, such 
as through labor adjustment. A first easing of layoff rules came through revised court rulings in 
2000, followed by a revision of the Labor Standard Law, effective 2004 (Schaede 2008). 
 For our study of corporate restructuring, the following four changes are of particular 
importance. First, the particular process of financial deregulation changed the client base of 
Japanese banks. Large companies no longer needed to rely as heavily on bank financing. Yet, the 
relationship between banks and new smaller customers was often not as extensive or tight. 
Because main banks were often leaders of corporate restructuring cases, this shift in bank-firm 
relationships may have affected processes of corporate restructuring. 
Second, among other things, Big Bang reforms brought new accounting rules that make 
the financial condition of public companies more transparent. Outside investors such as foreign 
private equity funds can now assess a company’s financial health more easily than before. This 
has opened the possibility that new investors play a role in corporate restructuring.  
 Third, in terms of corporate reorganization the Commercial Code was revised literally 
every year beginning in 1997/98, and eventually replaced by a new Corporation Law in 2006. 
The gist of these revisions was to allow for greater flexibility in corporate reorganization by 
facilitating spinoffs, spinouts, different types of stock, stock swaps, mergers and acquisitions.2 
One big impact of these reforms has been an increase in hostile takeover attempts, which is a 
new cause for concern for executives at underperforming firms. A new wave of proactive 
restructuring set in, whereby large firms refocused on core businesses, spun off non-core 
operations and restructured their finances. Importantly for our study, these legal reforms also 
afforded leaders of forced restructuring – the main bank, a lead company, or a consortium of both 
– much more flexibility in how to restructure a distressed company (Yanagawa 2006; Schaede 
                                                 
2 For example, one important change was to revoke the veto right of employees in case of a spin-out. 
Previously, corporate unions had rejected such moves on the ground that traditionally smaller firms in 
Japan paid lower salaries. The revocation of this rule took labor out of the restructuring equation. 
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2008). 
 A fourth major change was the complete revision of bankruptcy laws. In their old 
versions, these had rarely been employed because they were too cumbersome, too expensive, and 
overall perceived as less efficient than an informal workout, such as an intervention by the main 
bank. However, in 2000 the new Civil Rehabilitation Law (Minji-saisei-hō) replaced the old, 
clumsy Composition Law (Wagi-hō) to design new court-based bankruptcy procedures.3 In 2003, 
the Corporate Reorganization Law (Kaisha kōsei hō) was revised to allow for Chapter 11-type 
turnarounds. In 2004, the Liquidation Law (Hasan-hō) was revised to simplify legal procedures 
for a shutdown and fair distribution of assets. Moreover, the 2001 “Guideline for Out-of-Court 
Workouts” added to this a new structure for bank-led workouts by stipulating how debt 
forgiveness should be organized in cases with multiple lenders but uncertain claims. While 
Koibuchi (2007) shows that this Guideline was rarely used, it represented yet another alternative 
for companies in distress.  
 Given these changes as the background, we now examine whether and how these have 
affected incidence and processes of corporate restructuring in Japan.  
  
 
3. Database and Overview Statistics 
 
 We have build a database of major episodes of corporate restructuring for the period 
1981-2007, in two-year interval (all odd years, a set of 14 years of observation), from newspaper 
articles. The Japanese word for restructuring is saiken (再建), and we searched for this word in 
Nikkei Telecom 21, an electronic database that includes Japan’s leading economic and financial 
newspapers published by Nihon Keizai Shinbun-sha (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, both morning and 
evening editions and including the economic sections of regional editions, Nihon Kin’yū Shinbun, 
Nihon Sangyō Shinbun, Nihon Ryūtsū Shinbun). We assume that the newspapers have been 
consistent in their reporting and word choice on saiken over time. Since the newspapers probably 
failed to report on all restructuring cases, the number of episodes in our database is the lower 
bound of the true frequency. However, looking at the cases we identified, we did not find any 
obvious omissions of major corporate restructuring cases. Thus, we are confident that our 
database includes all major cases of restructuring in those years.4 Moreover, because episodes of 
                                                 
3 Another legal based procedure was “Corporate Reordering” (Kaisha-seiri) based on the Commercial 
Code. This was also cumbersome, and it was discontinued with the Corporation Law of 2006. 
4 Also note that the Japanese language is much more consistent in word use than English. For example, 
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restructuring typically last longer than one year, we are confident that we have picked up most 
episodes generated in even years as well. 
 In the next step, we identified those articles that focused on corporate restructuring by 
publicly listed companies, because this allows us to combine our database with accounting and 
financial data. Upon this identification, we digitized the information in each newspaper account, 
to build a database that contains important characteristics of each restructuring episode. This 
included the coding of information on: timing; the role of the restructuring leader (such as the 
main bank or an affiliated company); any reliance on laws and courts; financial restructuring 
(such as debt forgiveness, interest concession); restructuring on the asset side of the balance 
sheet (asset sales or stock sales); managerial change (dispatch of directors, turnover of incumbent 
managers); corporate reorganization (spinoffs or exit from a business); labor adjustment (layoffs, 
early retirement, hiring freeze or employee dispatches); and salary adjustments (wage or bonus 
cuts, executive compensation reduction).  
 For the entire period, we observed a total of 1,610 episodes of corporate restructuring. 
Table 1 shows some summary statistics for the restructuring cases for the 26-year period, divided 
into four sub-periods: (1) pre-bubble (1981-1985); (2) bubble (1987-1991); (3) recession 
(1993-1997); and (4) strategic inflection (1999-2007). As one might expect, there were fewer 
cases of restructuring during the bubble (241 in total), and more during the strategic inflection 
turnaround beginning in 1999 (602). We can already see signs for change just by looking at this 
table. For example, in the fourth period, companies have become more active in reorganization 
(e.g., exiting lines of business or liquidating affiliates). In terms of financial restructuring, it 
appears that interest rate reduction has been in decline, whereas measures such as debt-equity 
swaps and new equity issues appear to be adopted more frequently. 
 Table 2 offers an overview of the data by type of restructuring leader; i.e., whether the 
effort was self-directed (or without leadership identified by the newspaper), led by the main bank 
or a group of banks, by a company or group of companies, by a consortium of banks and 
companies, or by a private equity fund (a new player beginning in the late 1990s). The table 
shows that the majority of restructuring cases was informal, as law and courts were used in only 
5.7% (probably due to the fact that laws were revised only beginning in 2000). When using a 
court-based procedure, a distressed company needs to identify a sponsor, which probably 
                                                                                                                                                             
whereas an English-language article may refer to “firms”, “companies” and “corporations” 
interchangeably and all with the same meaning – presumably to avoid tediousness in word repetition – a 
Japanese-language article would use the same word, even if repeatedly. This tendency toward word 
choice consistency is helpful for our exercise. 
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explains the large role played by other companies in this category (31 cases). Bank-led 
restructurings were almost always conducted out-of-court. All leaders appear roughly equally 
likely to dispatch directors and replace the management of the distressed firm. Episodes led by a 
group of banks tend to have a higher incidence of corporate reorganization, labor adjustments, 
and salary adjustments. Overall, these data afford us great opportunity to study differences in 
corporate restructuring over time, and by type of leader. 
 For our analysis of the meaning of such differences, we also look at the financial 
conditions of the companies undergoing restructuring. We source this information from the 
Nikkei Financial Database, which contains accounting and financial data for all listed firms, as 
well as firms that used to be listed but ceased to exist. Overview statistics for all listed firms are 
presented in Table 3.  
 
 
4. Data Analysis and Findings  
 
 We begin our analysis with a few graphs that highlight how distressed companies that 
undergo restructuring differ from distressed firms that do not. In our analysis, we use two 
alternative approaches to classify “distress”. First, we define a company to be in distress if its 
interest rate coverage ratio was below one for the previous two years. Alternatively, we classify a 
company to be in distress if it has just experienced two consecutive years of negative net profits. 
Figure 1 shows the ratio of all distressed firms that are undergoing restructuring. There 
appears to be a downward trend in firms with negative net profits to undergo restructuring 
(Figure 1a). Figure 1b shows limited enthusiasm for restructuring firms with low interest rate 
coverage ratios during the bubble period (1987-1991). Overall, we can see variation across 
periods as well as long-term changes. 
 Figure 2 shows differences across firms under distress that undergo restructuring from 
those that do not, in terms of employment adjustment. It appears that distressed firms under 
restructuring reduce their labor force more than those not undergoing restructuring. Figure 3 
shows that distressed firms under restructuring reduce their debt more than other distressed 
firms.  
 
4.1. Changes in the Likelihood of Undergoing Restructuring Over Time 
 To understand the apparent decline in the incidence of restructuring by distressed firms, 
we estimate several probit regressions. The dependent variable is “saiken”, which takes the value 
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1 if a firm is identified to be under restructuring, and 0 if not. We examine whether the likelihood 
of undergoing restructuring in determined by whether the company is in financial distress or not 
(using both measures discussed above), and by the company’s dependence on bank borrowings 
(measured by the ratio of total bank debt to total assets). Moreover, we look at how relations 
have changed over time.   
The estimation results are shown in Table 4. The first column reports the minimal 
specification that includes the bank debt to assets ratio; (the natural logarithm of) total assets 
(both measured at the beginning of the period); and a 0-1 variable that identifies a company with 
an interest coverage ratio below one for the two previous years. The coefficient estimates on 
these variables are all positive and statistically significant. Thus, not surprisingly, companies 
with extremely low interest coverage ratios are more likely to be restructured. Companies that 
depend more on bank debt are also more likely to be restructured, as are larger companies.  
In the specification reported in the second column, we add a two-year lag of the saiken 
variable as an explanatory variable, to see if a company under restructuring is likely to stay under 
restructuring for more than two years. We can also think of this as an attempt to control for the 
existence of chronically depressed and restructured companies. Because the lag of saiken is not 
available for the first year of our sample (1981), the number of observation drops. The 
coefficient estimate on the lagged saiken is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that a 
company under restructuring is indeed more likely to continue being restructured, even after two 
years. The coefficient estimates on the other variables are now a bit smaller but still positive and 
statistically significant. 
The third specification controls for industry effects, by adding industry dummies. While 
there is variation across industries, no industries stand out as driving the results. All the 
coefficient estimates that we report remain positive and statistically significant.   
 Finally, in the last column, we add “main bank dependence” as an independent variable. 
This is measured as the amount of loans from the largest lender divided by total bank loans to the 
company. This variable was originally calculated by one of the authors for a different research 
project that covered fewer industries and ended in 2002. In a future version of this paper, we plan 
to calculate this variable for all companies in our sample, and for all years. While limits on this 
variable reduce the sample size, we still have 17,800 observations. We find that “main bank 
dependence” has a positive association, but the finding is not significant.  
 We repeated estimation of all these specifications by using net profits instead of interest 
coverage ratio to classify “distress”. The results (not reported) are essentially the same. 
 Next, we examine possible changes over the four periods – pre-bubble, bubble, 1990s 
 - 9 - 
recession, and strategic inflection. We do this by adding period dummy variables for these 
sub-periods and interacting them with some key explanatory variables. Table 5 reports the results. 
The specification in the first column adds the interaction between the period dummy and the 
distress variable. The estimated coefficients on the interaction terms suggest that the impact of 
“distress” on the likelihood of restructuring has faded over time. Compared with the 1983-1985 
period, in each subsequent period the likelihood that a distressed company will undergo 
restructuring has declined. While this finding is not statistically significant for the 1987-1991 
period, it is significant for the subsequent two periods.  
 In the second column, we add an interaction term between the bank debt to total assets 
ratio and the period dummies. We find that the impact of dependence on bank debt by a 
distressed company on the likelihood of restructuring also declines over time. Even though 
companies with higher bank debt dependence continue to be more likely to be restructured, the 
difference between companies with high levels of bank debt from those with low levels of bank 
debt becomes much smaller in later periods. The estimated coefficients suggest that the impact of 
bank debt declined monotonically over time.   
 Finally, we examine changes in the importance of main bank dependence over time. 
Again, the number of observations is reduced now, due to temporary data constraints. Recall that 
in Table 4 we estimated the impact of main bank dependence without considering possible 
changes over time, and found the coefficient estimate to be positive but statistically insignificant.  
When we now allow the coefficient estimate to be different for the four periods, we find a 
positive, statistically significant impact for the first period (1983-1985). The interaction terms are 
all negative, and the point estimate is negative and grows over time. In fact, for the last 
sub-period the sum of the coefficient estimates on the interaction term and main bank 
dependence is negative, suggesting that higher main bank dependence reduced the likelihood of 
restructuring, although this result is probably not statistically significant.  
 Overall, the results provide some new insights into the changes in determinants for 
restructuring events over time. Clearly, distressed firms with more bank debt are more likely to 
be restructured, but over time this tendency has declined. The well-established practice whereby 
large firms in distress, with a high debt to assets ratio, would undergo restructuring, especially if 
they had a strong main bank, seems to have weakened over time.  
 
4.2. Differences in the Processes of Restructuring 
 In addition to changes in the likelihood of a distressed firm undergoing restructuring 
over time, our second question is whether restructuring content has changed as well.  
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 We first look at employment adjustment, measured as growth in the number of 
employees over the previous year. From Figure 2, we already know that on average, distressed 
companies undergoing restructuring reduce their labor force more than distressed companies not 
under restructuring. Regression analysis confirms this result. Here we use the saiken variable as 
an explanatory variable for employment growth. The regression also includes a one-year lag of 
employment growth, to capture persistence at the firm level. We also include year dummies and 
industry dummies to control for any time-specific or industry-specific fixed effects. Finally, all 
regression specifications also include the distress dummy as an explanatory variable.   
Table 6 reports the results. To mitigate problems caused by a few extreme observations, 
in this and all following regressions that use growth variables as the dependent variable, we drop 
all observations where either the growth rate or the lagged growth rate is below -50% or above 
100%. The regression is estimated by OLS, and robust standard errors suggested by White 
(1980) are reported in parentheses. The basic specification in the first column shows that 
distressed companies in general have lower employment growth, which is not surprising. When 
we control for the general effect of distress on employment growth, the regression result shows 
that companies under restructuring reduce employment even more. The point estimate suggests 
that employment growth in firms undergoing restructuring is 3.5% lower.  
The specification in the second column adds the interaction term between the distress 
variable and saiken to examine whether being under restructuring further reduces employment 
growth for distressed firms. The negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term confirms that this is indeed the case. The point estimate suggests that 
restructuring by distressed firms lowers employment growth by 5.3%, while it reduces 
employment growth in non-distress firms by 3.0%. 
In the third column, we introduce interaction terms between saiken and the period 
dummies to see whether the employment impact of restructuring changed over time. The 
estimated coefficients on all interaction terms are tiny and not significantly different from zero.  
Thus, we conclude that restructuring consistently led to lower employment growth throughout 
the entire period. 
 Table 7 reports a similar regression analysis with capital growth (growth in depreciable 
assets, a proxy for investment rate) as the dependent variable. Similar to employment growth, 
distressed firms experience reduced capital growth. Firms under restructuring reduce capital 
growth even more. However, in contrast to employment, the coefficient estimates on the 
interaction terms are large. The coefficient estimate is positive and statistically significant for the 
1993-1997 period. This suggests that firms under restructuring did not reduce capital growth as 
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much as have in recent years, and this is especially true for the mid-1990s. 
 Similar regressions reported in Table 8 examine the growth of bank loans during 
restructuring. For the stereotypical bank rescue case, one may expect the lead bank to increase 
loans to help the troubled client – with debt forgiveness being the extreme example - while in 
some cases reducing the debt burden may be more effective for the turnaround effort. There is no 
empirical evidence that the average firm under bank rescue increased its loans, as pointed out by 
Miwa (1985) and Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990). Our results confirm this finding, as 
bank loan growth is not higher for firms undergoing restructuring.  
Looking at the basic specification in column 1 of Table 8, we find that distressed 
companies tend to reduce bank loan growth. It is not clear whether this is demand-driven (the 
company refrains from borrowing more) or supply-driven (the bank refuses to lend more). The 
estimated coefficient on saiken is essentially zero, suggesting that restructuring does not affect 
bank loan growth. We add the interaction between saiken and the distress dummy in the second 
column, and the interaction between saiken and period dummies in the third column. In none of 
these specifications do we find saiken to have any significant impact on bank loan growth.  
 In contrast, the results for total debt reduction differ. Recall that Figure 3 suggests that 
distressed firms under restructuring reduce their debt more than other distressed firms. Table 9 
shows regression results for the growth rate of total debt. Distressed firms tend to have lower 
total debt growth in all specifications. Again we cannot be sure whether this is driven by demand 
or supply. But unlike for bank loans, we find that firms under restructuring tend to reduce the 
growth rate of total debt, although this result becomes insignificant when we interact saiken with 
the period dummies in the specification shown in the last column.   
 Overall, we find that firms under restructuring tend to reduce their growth of 
employment, capital, and total debt. We do not find evidence for any change in this tendency 
over time, with a weak evidence for reduced impact of restructuring on capital growth during the 
mid-1990s. 
 
4.3. The Role of the Restructuring Leader 
 We now turn to the question whether there are differences in process, depending on who 
leads the restructuring episode. Table 2 showed preliminary data on such differences, as well as 
six categories of leaders of restructuring: the main bank, a group of banks, a company or group 
of companies, a combination thereof, or a private equity fund.  
 First, we examine whether growth of employment, capital, bank loans or total debt 
differ depending on the identity of the leader(s). To do this, we regress the growth variable on its 
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lag and six dummy variables, each taking the value 1 for a particular type of leadership. Since 
our regression includes a constant term, the excluded category self-leadership (including cases 
where the restructuring leader is unidentified). Results reported in column 1 of Table 10 show no 
differences across restructuring leadership in terms of employment growth. Likewise, capital 
growth rates do not differ greatly, with one exception: when a group of companies leads the 
restructuring, capital growth is reduced more than with other leaders (column 2) 
 In contrast, in terms of bank loan growth we find some interesting differences (column 
3). Loans are reduced more when either one bank or a fund are the leaders. Results for both of 
these leaders are strong and significant, suggesting that these two leadership forms may ask for 
more aggressive measures of financial restructuring. A similar finding, though slightly weaker 
for funds, can be seen for total debt growth.  
 The apparent differences between bank leadership and other types of leadership prompt 
us to look at the factors that make a bank-led restructuring more likely and how those changed 
over time. To examine this issue, we estimate a series of probit models similar to those above 
regarding the determinants of restructuring events and changes over time. Here, the dependent 
variable, “bank-led”, takes the value 1 if a restructuring episodes is led by a single bank 
(probably the main bank), and 0 otherwise. Note that the bank-led variable is defined only for 
those firms under restructuring that we coded for our database, and the sample size for this 
analysis is at most 1,610. Industry dummies are included in all specifications, as are period 
dummies when we add interaction terms with periods.   
The results in Table 11 suggest that large size and a high bank debt to assets ratio increase 
the probability of bank-led restructuring. As shown earlier, restructured firms tend to be larger 
and have a higher dependence on bank debt. The results here suggest that – even in this limited 
sample of firms under restructuring – firms under bank-led restructuring stand out for having 
more assets and higher bank dependence. The distress dummy does not seem to matter, 
suggesting that bank-led restructuring does not address the level of distress, at least as measured 
by our classification of interest rate coverage or negative net profits.   
The specification in the second column includes main bank dependence as an additional 
explanatory variable. As one might expect, we find that higher dependence on a main bank 
increases the probability of bank-led restructuring. 
The third specification includes the interaction terms between bank debt to total assets 
ratio and the four periods, as well as those between the distress dummy and the periods. Main 
bank dependence is not included in this specification. The distress dummy does not matter in any 
period. In contrast, we find interesting changes over time for the bank debt to total assets ratio. 
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For the 1981-1985 period, high bank debt is associated with a higher probability of bank-led 
restructuring. For the 1987-1991 period, the impact is slightly negative but perhaps not 
statistically significant from zero, suggesting high bank debt did not increase the likelihood of 
the bank-led restructuring. However, for the 1993-1997 period, the impact becomes positive 
again, even though the magnitude is smaller than the 1981-1985 period. For the 1999-2007 
period, the impact is positive and actually larger than in the 1981-1985 period.  
The last column reports a specification that includes the interaction term between main 
bank dependence and the four periods, in addition to the interactions between the distress 
dummy and the periods. Again, the distress dummy does not matter in any sub-period.  The 
point estimates on the interaction terms with main bank dependence suggest that the importance 
of high main bank dependence as a determinant of bank-led restructuring declined over time, 
although the change is not statistically significant. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 Using a unique database on major corporate restructuring cases in Japan, this paper 
examined what type of firms are more likely to be restructured, what restructuring implies for the 
company’s employment, investment, and debt, and how those relations changed over time. 
 Our analysis offers three important findings. First, the likelihood for firms in distress to 
undergo restructuring has apparently decreased over time. Throughout the period 1981-2007, the 
larger the company in distress and the higher its dependence on bank debt, the more likely it was 
to undergo restructuring. However, this likelihood has declined over time. This suggests that 
there are some large and highly bank-dependent companies that would have been restructured in 
the early 1980s but are not in the 2000s. The result supports the argument put forward by 
Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) that a lack of restructuring in the 1990s and the early 
2000s created many zombie firms and slowed down the economy. 
 Second, we find that it makes a difference who leads the restructuring efforts. When a 
bank or a fund takes charge, the distressed firm reduces debt and bank loans more aggressively. 
Main bank-led restructuring continues to be effective when it happens, although it appears to 
happen less frequently over time. 
 Third, distressed firms that undergo restructuring tend to reduce expansion in 
employment, capital, and debt more than other distressed firms. At the most basic level, this 
means that restructuring is real, and not simply an announcement exercise. Whether differences 
in restructuring lead to differences in performance is another issue that we leave for future 
research. 
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Period 1981-1985 1987-1991 1993-1997 1999-2007
Restructuring Cases 331 241 436 602
Proportion of cases for each event
director dispatch 1.23% 0.71% 1.12% 0.75%
managerial turnover 22.05% 22.13% 26.65% 25.74%
executive bonus cut 5.14% 2.87% 4.69% 7.11%
change of restructuring plan 3.32% 2.87% 4.20% 3.31%
asset sale 26.59% 20.33% 23.39% 17.11%
stock sale 6.04% 7.47% 8.72% 9.47%
exit from a business line 10.27% 8.20% 12.58% 21.16%
new entry 8.16% 12.30% 4.26% 4.30%
spin off 17.82% 15.98% 12.37% 11.07%
liquidation of affiliated companies 9.37% 8.20% 10.66% 19.17%
new loans 2.42% 4.56% 5.05% 3.49%
interest reduction 8.46% 1.64% 5.54% 0.83%
debt forgiveness 1.51% 3.32% 1.83% 9.80%
debt equity swap 0.30% 0.00% 0.00% 3.31%
new equity issue 8.16% 8.71% 7.57% 18.60%
equity reduction 2.42% 3.28% 0.43% 6.94%
size reduction 13.90% 9.84% 15.57% 15.87%
cost reduction 20.54% 18.44% 23.45% 15.54%
sales promotion 19.03% 20.49% 15.57% 14.88%
relocation of labor 11.18% 3.69% 6.61% 4.30%
furlough 1.21% 0.00% 0.64% 0.00%
stop new hires 8.76% 2.05% 9.81% 4.96%
early retirement 38.53% 12.31% 19.43% 41.22%
layoffs 2.11% 8.20% 5.12% 2.31%
shukko (employee dispatch) 9.37% 4.51% 7.89% 4.30%
wage reduction 3.63% 1.23% 1.07% 5.12%
bonus cut 1.51% 0.41% 0.85% 1.82%
Reorganization (exit, spinoff, size
reduction) 1.75% 1.00% 2.14% 1.85%
Adjustment of employment
(relocation, furlough, stop new hires,
early retirement, layoffs, dispatch) 1.51% 0.63% 1.76% 0.93%
Salary or bonus adjustment (wage
cut, salary cut, executive bonus
reduction) 0.37% 0.12% 0.30% 0.39%
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Total 968 135 286 50 41 109 21 1,610
Number of Cases based on Bankruptcy or Liquidation Laws
NA 932 131 256 43 36 101 19 1,518
Liquidation Law 0 1 1 1 0 2 0 5
Corporate Reorganization Law (rev. 2003) 25 1 21 4 4 1 0 56
Commercial Code-based (until 2006) 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 3
Composition Law (unti l 2000) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Civil Rehabilitaiton Law (2000 onward) 10 1 6 2 1 5 2 27
Total law-based 36 4 30 7 5 8 2 92
% 3.7 3.0 10.5 14.0 12.2 7.3 9.5 5.7
Number of Executives Dispatched
0 955 66 144 32 21 41 13 1,272
1 8 51 92 7 12 23 5 198
2 4 9 28 6 1 16 3 67
3 0 4 6 1 3 5 0 19
4 0 1 6 2 1 10 0 20
5-13 1 4 10 2 3 14 0 34
Number of Cases with Executive Replacement
0 786 88 184 33 26 69 16 1,202
1 182 47 102 17 15 40 5 408
% 18.8 34.8 35.7 34.0 36.6 36.7 23.8 25.3
Number of Revisions in Reorganization Plans
0 947 126 281 44 39 102 21 1,560
1 20 9 3 5 2 6 0 45
2 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 3
3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
Cases with Corporate Reorganization (exit, spinoff, liquidation ) 
0 583 69 210 20 20 50 13 965
1 385 66 76 30 21 59 8 645
% 39.8 48.9 26.6 60.0 51.2 54.1 38.1 40.1
Cases with Labor Adjustments (furlough, no new hires, early retirement, dispatch)
0 688 101 234 34 31 70 21 1,179
1 280 34 52 16 10 39 0 431
% 28.9 25.2 18.2 32.0 24.4 35.8 0.0 26.8
Cases with Salary Adjustments (wage reduction, bonus cuts, executive compensation cuts)
0 903 121 277 38 38 95 20 1,492
1 65 14 9 12 3 14 1 118
% 6.7 10.4 3.1 24.0 7.3 12.8 4.8 7.3
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Financial Data for All Listed Firms, 1981-2007 


























Period 1981-1985 1987-1991 1993-1997 1999-2007
% of firms under
restructuring 0.051 0.033 0.053 0.039
% of firms with negative
net profits for 2 years 0.023 0.014 0.041 0.072
% of firms with interest
coverage ratio <1 for 2
years 0.095 0.152 0.177 0.153
total assets 104,676.8 153,415.9 176,638.8 162,657.7
total bank loans 35,230.5 43,034.3 44,476.8 34,309.7
total debt 42,093.5 61,626.2 69,667.0 54,999.8
bank debt to total assets
ratio 0.280 0.235 0.225 0.230
total debt to total assets
ratio 0.299 0.291 0.294 0.268
employment growth 0.010 0.023 0.006 0.011
sales growth 0.082 0.088 0.058 0.277
profit rate (net profit /
total assets) 0.028 0.031 0.016 0.021
net profits 1,964.2 2,741.1 1,805.1 2,071.2
interest coverage ratio 1.137 0.215 9.924 0.863
main bank dependence
(proportion of loans from
the largest lender) 0.256 0.273 0.277 0.294
amount of loan from the
largest lender (avg per
firm) 2,922.1 4,106.6 5,402.0 5,627.5
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Figure 1: Restructuring and Distress 
 
Figure 1a:   Ratio of firms under restructuring to number of firms with negative net profits  
















Figure 1b: Ratio of firms under restructuring to number of firms with interest coverage  
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 Figure 2: Employment adjustment by firms under distress, comparing firms under 


















Figure 3:  Debt Reduction by firms under distress, comparing firms under 
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Table 4: Regression Results: Determinants of Restructuring 
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 






























main bank dependence    0.174 
(0.113) 
Period dummies No No No No 
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes 
Number of observations 36486 33637 33307 17800 
 
Note to Table 4: The dependent variable is saiken that takes 1 if the firm was under restructuring 
during the year (and 0 otherwise). Each column reports the coefficient estimates and standard 
errors (in the parentheses) for a probit model. The sample period is every odd year from 1981 to 
2007. The model also includes a constant term. The rows “Period dummies” and “Industry 
dummies” indicate inclusion of these dummies (yes/no). The coefficient estimates for the period 
dummies, industry dummies and the constant term are not reported. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Restructuring: Changes Over Time 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 






bank debt / total assets 




bank debt / total assets 




bank debt / total assets 










ICR < 1 for 2 years 







ICR < 1 for 2 years 







ICR < 1 for 2 years 



















main bank dependence   0.715 
(0.257) 
main bank dependence 
X (1987-1991 dummy) 
  0.121 
(0.326) 
main bank dependence 
X (1993-1997 dummy) 
  -0.511 
(0.308) 
main bank dependence 
X (1999-2007 dummy) 
  -1.241 
(0.316) 
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 33307 33307 17800 
 
Note to Table 5: The dependent variable is saiken that takes 1 if the firm was under restructuring 
during the year, and 0 otherwise. Each column reports the coefficient estimates and standard 
errors (in the parentheses) for a probit model. The sample period is every odd year from 1981 to 
2007. The model also includes a constant term. The rows “Period dummies” and “Industry 
dummies” indicate inclusion of these dummies (yes/no). The coefficient estimates for the period 
dummies, industry dummies and the constant term are not reported. 
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 Table 6:  Restructuring and Employment Growth 
 
 



























X (1987-1991 dummy) 
  0.0080 
(0.0090) 
saiken 
X (1993-1997 dummy) 
  0.0064 
(0.0079) 
saiken 
X (1999-2007 dummy) 
  0.0001 
(0.0081) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 26750 26750 26750 
R-squared .188 .189 .188 
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Table 7: Restructuring and Capital Growth 
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
























X (1987-1991 dummy) 
  0.010 
(0.016) 
saiken 
X (1993-1997 dummy) 
  0.037 
(0.013) 
saiken 
X (1999-2007 dummy) 
  0.015 
(0.012) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 26750 26750 26750 
R-squared .162 .162 .162 
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 Table 8:  Restructuring and Bank Loan Growth 
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
























X (1987-1991 dummy) 
  -0.0095 
(0.023) 
saiken 
X (1993-1997 dummy) 
  0.035 
(0.019) 
saiken 
X (1999-2007 dummy) 
  0.0056 
(0.017) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 26750 26750 26750 
R-squared .207 .207 .207 
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 Table 9:  Restructuring and Growth of Total Debt 
 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
























X (1987-1991 dummy) 
  -0.028 
(0.022) 
saiken 
X (1993-1997 dummy) 
  0.026 
(0.017) 
saiken 
X (1999-2007 dummy) 
  0.0019 
(0.016) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 26750 26750 26750 
R-squared .201 .201 .201 
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 Table 10:  Restructuring by Identity of Leader 
 























































led by a group of banks 

























Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1173 1173 1173 1173 
R-squared .101 .155 .217 .191 
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 Table 11:  Determinants of Bank-led Restructuring 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 








bank debt / total assets 
X (1987-1991 dummy) 
  -1.452 
(0.816) 
 
bank debt / total assets 
X (1993-1997 dummy) 
  -0.286 
(0.656) 
 
bank debt / total assets 
X (1999-2007 dummy) 
  0.234 
(0.652) 
 








ICR < 1 for 2 years 
X (1987-1991 dummy) 




ICR < 1 for 2 years 
X (1993-1997 dummy) 




ICR < 1 for 2 years 
X (1999-2007 dummy) 
















main bank dependence 
X (1987-1991 dummy) 
   -0.227 
(0.353) 
main bank dependence 
X (1993-1997 dummy) 
   -0.517 
(0.314) 
main bank dependence 
X (1999-2007 dummy) 
   -0.659 
(0.339) 
Period dummies No No Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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